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This chapter offers an account of cooperation 
between Mexico and the US around labor issues 
from 1994, when the NAFTA labor side agreement 
first made labor issues relevant to US-Mexico 
foreign relations, to the present, where that 
cooperation has broken down substantially. I 
argue that while the NAFTA labor side accord 
features strong institutions created to 
reinforce trilateral cooperation on labor 
issues, the weak resolutions across NAALC 
cases and the breakdown of labor cooperation 
across these and other channels show that 
institutional frameworks are not enough to 
promote cooperation in North America if 
commitment to labor cooperation and a strong 
policy direction do not complement institution 
building. 
 
Mexican-US relations in the area of labor cooperation have 
become an important aspect of the binational agenda, mostly 
due to the effect that the NAFTA agreement has had on 
strengthening US-Mexico relations in general. Labor 
cooperation has also become more important over time as the 
relationship has been channeled through the NAFTA 
institutions that were set up to promote labor issues. 
However, in recent years, formal channels of labor 
cooperation-- meetings between the representatives of these 
respective governments—have broken down considerably.  
 
In this chapter, I offer an account of how the formal 
channels for labor cooperation between the US and Mexico 
have evolved, and offer a panorama of the scope and content 
of US-Mexico labor cooperation since 1994, based 
principally on a review of the North American Agreement on 
Labor Cooperation (NAALC), NAFTA’s side accord on labor.  
Unlike in other areas of cooperation in North America, 
labor issues potentially benefit from a range of new 
institutions established by NAFTA to open channels of 
communication at all levels of government between the NAFTA 
countries, as well as a unique labor dispute resolution 
mechanism that reveals common labor violations, encouraging 
states to collaborate to strengthen labor protections for 
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the workers of North America. Yet, I argue that while the 
NAFTA labor side accord thus features an number of 
institutions created to reinforce trilateral cooperation, 
the weak resolutions across NAALC cases and the breakdown 
of labor cooperation across these channels show that an 
institutional framework is not enough to promote 
cooperation in North America. Rather, the absence of policy 
direction in the NAALC has meant that the framework of the 
side agreement has been adapted by member states to avoid 
labor cooperation, leading to an important breakdown in 
these channels of collaboration in recent years. As such, 
this contribution to the edited volume shows that 
institutions may be necessary, but are not a sufficient by 
themselves to promote cooperation among the states in North 
America. 
 
Early Efforts at Cooperation on US-Mexico Labor Issues 
 
Formal channels of US-Mexico cooperation on labor issues 
date from meetings of the Mexico-United States Binational 
Commission, the most important forum for high-level 
dialogue between the executives of both states (Secretaria 
de Relaciones Exteriores n.d.), which by 1989 included 
representatives from the Ministries of Labor. Labor issues 
would become more salient the next year as the Mexicans 
approached the US delegation at the World Economic Forum 
and asked them to consider a trade deal (Cameron and Tomlin 
2000).  Once Canada was to be included, and all three 
states publicly declared an intention to negotiate what 
would eventually become the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), labor issues took on a new importance in 
North America.  
 
First, initial discussions on the trade deal imagined labor 
mobility within North America, an idea quickly scrapped but 
since taken up again in recent discussions on reopening the 
NAFTA agreements (Viano 2010). Even without EU-style 
integrated labor markets, it is clear that labor is no 
longer a bordered phenomenon in some productive sectors in 
North America, while access to labor arbitration remains 
largely rooted in domestic processes. With a set of 
supranational standards and institutions, workers who 
experienced violations of their rights could apply for 
redress regardless of where the violations took place, and 
without regard to their national status.  Second, the US 
and Canada both have mature industrial relations systems 
and efficient labor law enforcement mechanisms, but while 
Mexico’s labor laws may have been the most progressive of 
the three, enforcement was and remains problematic. Given 
these asymmetries, US policymakers worried that a trade 
agreement may draw US businesses to Mexico, where labor 
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costs were cheaper and industrial relations less well 
regulated. 
  
As the NAFTA negotiations wore on, it became clear that the 
trade accord would have to address labor issues in order to 
pass Congressional ratification in the United States. 
Democratic legislators, responding to union’s concerns that 
trade integration would pull jobs from the US to Mexico, 
and worried that weaker labor regulations in Mexico would 
then create pressures to weaken regulations in the US, 
lobbied for the inclusion of labor guarantees to the 
negotiation agenda (Hafner-Burton 2009). As such, the 
Democrats tied fast track negotiation authority to the 
inclusion of labor protections in the trade accord.  After 
six rounds that threatened at times to upend the entire 
negotiation (Cameron and Tomlin 2000), an agreement was 
reached on the labor and environmental side accords in 
August of 1993, and signed in September. 
 
The NAALC Institutions  
 
Instead of developing new regional labor standards, as most 
of the groups that opposed NAFTA had wanted, the labor side 
agreement only obliges the three nations to "effectively 
enforce" their own national labor laws (Compa 2001; 
International Labor Rights Fund 1995).1 What the NAALC 
accord does contribute to the protection of labor rights in 
North America is a set of new institutions dedicated to the 
arbitration and resolution of violations of NAFTA’s labor 
rights principles. The agreement establishes a National 
Administrative Office (NAO) in each state to oversee the 
process of filing cases for dispute resolution, and these 
are the national offices that receive labor rights 
petitions.2 The NAALC also established new formal channels 
for trinational cooperation and coordination around labor 
rights issues in all three states. The Commission for Labor 
Cooperation (CLC) includes a tri-national Secretariat that 
assists the NAOs and the three labor ministers in 
                                                            
1 The NAALC agreement mentions 11 labor rights principles, including 
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, 
health and occupational safety, discrimination at work, technical 
labor standards (including wages and hours), and the rights of 
migrant workers, which largely mirror the labor rights enumerated in 
the International Labor Organization’s 1998 Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and  Rights at Work.  
 
2 In the US, the NAO is now known as the Office of Trade and Labor 
Affairs (OTLA). I will refer to it as the US NAO to stay consistent 
with the parallel institutions in Mexico and Canada. 
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administering the activities associated with the NAALC.3 As 
such, the NAALC process, and the institutions associated 
with the parallel accord have also served to strengthen and 
institutionalize contact between US and Mexican labor 
officials in a manner that has been constant, and at times, 
fruitful, for promoting labor rights protection in both 
countries. 
 
Labor Dispute Resolution 
 
The NAALC agreement also establishes a unique dispute 
resolution procedure for labor issues that is unrelated to 
the dispute provisions for investment or trade and 
commerce, and which allows individuals to bring cases 
against states under the terms of the agreement. During the 
arbitration process, any citizen or group can file a 
complaint with an NAO regarding the target state's 
performance on labor law enforcement. Once a case is filed 
alleging violations of any of these principles, the NAO has 
the option to review the complaint further or not. If a 
review is granted, the NAO then researches the allegations, 
attempts to verify them through discussions with the NAO in 
the state where the violation took place, and most 
importantly, assesses whether such violations are 
consistent with national labor law in the state in 
question. The NAO then makes a public report on how issues 
raised in the case could be addressed. 
 
Through 2010, 41 petitions have been filed regarding labor 
rights violations in 36 separate cases, with 26 total 
petitions filed against Mexico.4  Of the forty-one 
petitions submitted to date, 27, or just over 66% of the 
petitions filed have been accepted for review, the second 
step in the arbitration process. However, the highest level 
of resolution for any case to date has been Ministerial 
Consultations, which are meetings between the labor 
ministers. These are generally discussions about labor 
rights issues raised in the case, and often result in 
Ministerial Agreements, official pronouncements on what 
states might do to resolve recurrent labor rights 
violations, including the cooperative activities and public 
outreach programs that are then overseen by the CLC. The 
fact that most cases in the NAALC have ended in promises 
between governments to talk about labor issues rather than 
                                                            
3 Since 1994, the commission has coordinated 69 cooperative activities, 
54 of which were held in Mexico, regarding labor issues in North 
America. These activities have ranged widely, from seminars on 
health and safety issues, to conferences about Mexico’s labor 
justice system, to worker outreach regarding the rights of women 
workers and agricultural workers. 
4 Two cases have been filed on Canada and 13 against the United States. 
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resolve them at the plant level has been one of the points 
of contention for critics of the NAALC, who charge that the 
NAALC is “toothless” because it doesn’t go far enough on 
punishing labor rights violations (Collingsworth 1996; 
Bensusán 2002; Singh 2002; Singh and Adams 2001). Still 
others note that the NAALC institutions were designed to 
not have strong regulatory power (Weiss 2003; Buchanan and 
Chaparro 2008), and therefore do not have the enforcement 
capacity that early challengers to NAFTA wanted.5 Given 
that the NAALC thus far has not been able to award the 
types of resolutions that filing groups wanted, a number of 
groups have turned away from the process altogether in 
recent years, leading to a decline in cases filed and 
reviewed, but also a breakdown in cooperative activities 
promoted by the CLC.6 
 
The Recent Breakdown in Binational Labor Cooperation  
 
Labor cooperation in North America has been further 
challenged by the politicization of the Department of Labor 
in the United States under the Bush Administration (2001-
2009). As such, after the 2000 election, the administration 
moved to isolate the Department of Labor and reverse the 
initiatives begun under the relatively pro-labor Clinton 
administration. The appointment of Republican officials 
that were hostile to labor into administrative positions in 
the Department of Labor, the reorganization of the 
international wing where the NAO is housed (the Bureau 
International Labor Affairs, ILAB), and cuts in funding to 
international labor rights programs during this period all 
in turn limited the ways that the US Department of Labor 
could addressed labor violations, including through 
international efforts like the NAALC.  
 
With the US suddenly not interested in pursuing labor 
cooperation further, Mexico was then better able to 
reassert its own lack of interest in developing the NAALC, 
creating a new, more defensive position vis-à-vis the US 
NAO.7  This in turn created new barriers to communication 
between the NAOs that caused friction in the relationship, 
and limited the ways that the US NAO could engage their 
                                                            
5 One example might be that most of the petitions, 29 of the total 41, 
feature freedom of association as the main violation, signaling that 
freedom of association violations are a major problem in North 
America, but it is these cases are not eligible for higher levels of 
resolution beyond Ministerial Consultations, including trade 
sanctions. 
6 The CLC office was closed in August of 2010. 
7 For example, Mexico took on a highly legalistic interpretation of 
their responsibilities under the NAALC, refusing to participate with 
the US NAO except for those activities and communication channels 
that were explicitly noted in the text of the NAALC agreement. 
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Mexican counterparts. The overall impact that the defensive 
position has left in the US is the perception that the 
Mexicans are no longer willing to cooperate on labor 
issues. The fact that the Mexican NAO has refused to 
participate in cooperative activities around even migrant 
labor issues, the singular labor issue that is important to 
them, only adds to the image that the Mexicans have become 
obstinate. 
  
This discussion of NAFTA’s labor side agreement underlines 
that compared to other issue areas, labor cooperation is 
one aspect of North American integration that is highly 
legalized, with a deep range of institutions. Yet, the 
institutionalization of labor cooperation has not been 
enough to assure cooperation in North America, much less 
the protection of labor rights. The creation of state-level 
labor offices, a trinational commission, regular meetings 
between high level officials, and continuous trilateral 
communication through the channels established by the side 
agreement have all largely failed to either strengthen 
labor protections, or maintain and deepen cooperation on 
North American labor regulation. What is left is a 
piecemeal approach to labor adjudication driven by the 
NAALC cases that in turn is subject to cross-cutting 
political interests in all three states. As the discussion 
on the politicization of the Department of Labor makes 
clear, the NAALC process over the last 10 years has been 
largely driven in by an interest in undermining the NAALC 
process, not strengthening it.8  While the inclusion of the 
labor side agreement to the trade accord made labor issues 
a solid part of the trilateral agenda, institutional 
channels for cooperation are shown here to mean little 
without a strong policy direction.   
 
Conclusions  
 
While labor issues have always been overshadowed by more 
pressing concerns between Mexico, the US, and Canada, after 
NAFTA, labor became a constant part of bilateral 
cooperation. On one hand, the NAALC established formal 
institutions and channels of communication for labor 
representatives, while on the other, the NAALC case process 
promoted cross-border mobilization between members of civil 
society in the US, Mexico and Canada. In turn, these 
channels of communication have formed the basis for better 
                                                            
8 The seemingly pro-labor agenda of the Obama administration remains 
agnostic on this point. Though there is a backlog of cases to 
resolve, and new cases under the CAFTA-DR and NAFTA agreements, the 
US NAO has not made an effort to reverse the inertia left by the 
leadership of Elaine Chao.  
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understanding of labor law and practice in all three 
states.  
 
Nonetheless, the path that labor cooperation has taken 
since NAFTA can provide some lessons on how the larger 
bilateral relationship could be nurtured and sustained. 
First, the structure of cooperation under the NAALC 
necessarily demanded constant contact between labor 
bureaucrats as the NAOs interacted to ask questions, 
solicit information and determine overall what should be 
done with each of the petitions that the NAO offices 
received. In turn, staff members developed a comfortable 
rapport with their counterparts that reinforced the 
cooperative spirit of the agreement, and kept the NAALC 
process from becoming adversarial.9 In turn, the 
cooperative spirit of the agreement set the tone for the 
wide range of activities of the CLC, which in the end, 
remains a core achievement of the agreement.  
 
However, the fallout after the politicization of the 
Department of Labor after 2001 shows that the bilateral 
relationship between Mexico and the United States –the 
major players in the NAALC accord-- needs to be actively 
supported. When the US NAO became embroiled in the 
politicization of the Department of Labor, the Mexican NAO 
then also withdrew from the NAALC process, in part because 
the US was no longer pushing them to participate. This in 
turn had an important effect on how the NAALC institutions 
functioned, as once they were neglected, petition sponsors 
then turned away from the process as well. Once subject to 
political interests within states, the NAALC, and other 
channels of labor cooperation in North America, broke down 
considerably, and to date, the NAALC has not yet recovered. 
 
What this chapter then shows is that in the absence of a 
strong policy direction from any of the three states on how 
to use the NAALC to develop areas for cooperation, and in 
turn to strengthen labor rights protection in North 
America, efforts at labor cooperation will remain stagnant, 
even with a wide set of institutions available to promote 
that cooperation. 
 
 
                                                            
9 Of course, most critics of the NAALC wish that it were more 
adversarial, so that its enforcement capacity would be of more use, 
but the states negotiated an agreement that kept the NAALC from 
having a strong enforcement capacity (Buchanan and Chaparro 2008; 
Weiss 2003). No state would have signed an agreement that had a 
stronger capacity to punish labor rights violations because no state 
wanted any other state to interfere in their labor laws or 
practices. Mexico nearly withdrew from the entire agreement over 
these very issues (Cameron and Tomlin 2000).   
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